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The Food Stamp Program (FSP) remains one of the most widely
used of all U.S. social "safety net" programs. While a substantial
body of research has developed around the primarygoals of the program-improvingfood access, nutrition, and health among lowincome families-less attention has been paid to the broadergoals
of hardshipand poverty reduction. Using 38 years of datafrom the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we examine several immediate
and longer-term economic outcomes of early adult FSP participationfor a sample of3,848 young mothers. While FSP participationis
associated with some negative outcomes in the immediatefuture in
areas includingfamily income-to-needs and transfer income, such
effects are substantially reduced or disappear over the long run.
These results suggest that concerns about the adverse economic effects of assistance,based solely on short-term outcomes or outcomes
measured at a single point in time, do not holdfor the long run. We
find no evidence thatfood stamp recipients in early motherhood are
any more or less dependenton publicassistanceprogramsthan other
young mothers who have low income but do not use food stamps.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2011, Volume XXXVIII, Number 4
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More than one in eight individuals in the U.S. currently
receives benefits from the Food Stamp Program (FSP) [now the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)]. Since
the emergence of the FSP as a pilot program in 1961, and as a
nationwide program in 1974, it has pursued the goal of helping
"low-income people and families buy the food they need for
good health" [Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), June 2010]. Although the
program's targeted approach to meeting a basic human need
has helped it to avoid the most virulent of attacks on the U.S.
welfare system (Super, 2004), evidence of SNAP's success in
meeting a broad range of objectives, particularly reductions in
food insecurity and improvements in nutrition and health, is
mixed (Gundersen, Jolliffe, & Tiehen, 2009).
The current economic downturn has brought with it substantial increases in both the number of recipients and the
amount spent on FSP/SNAP. The USDA estimates that over
40.4 million people were enrolled in the program as of April
2010, an increase of almost 20 percent from only a year earlier.
According to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates,
two-thirds of the 2008-2009 increase was generated by increased enrollment (CBO, 2009).
The expansion of benefits, even as enrollments have risen
sharply, suggests that the desire to provide for low-income
families and to employ them as agents of stimulus spending
has, for now, trumped concerns about expense and program
dependency. Moreover, as Douglas Besharov and Karen
Baehler (1993) have noted, the expansion of federally-funded
food stamp benefits relieves, to some degree, pressures on
states to expand eligibility, access, and benefits to joint stateand federally-funded cash assistance programs. Still, given
historically unprecedented high rates of participation, interest in tracking a variety of program participation outcomes
-both consumption and health-related, as well as economic
-will persist. Some, such as Robert Rector (2001), claim that
the FSP seeks to maximize casesloads and dependence on the
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program by allowing people to receive assistance without
work requirements. Whether FSP participation does, in fact,
"promote dependency" is an unsettled question; research evidence is mixed and is highly sensitive to method and to both
the timeframe and outcome under consideration (Gundersen,
Jolliffe, & Tiehen, 2009).
We argue that it is important to tease apart short-term from
longer-term FSP-participation effects, as well as to differentiate between consumption and health-related outcomes (which
FSP participation is manifestly intended to effect) and economic
outcomes (which are often the focal point of dependency concerns). Using both standard regression and sister fixed-effects
models and 38 years of data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), we examine several short and longer-term
economic outcomes of FSP participation for a sample of 3,848
young mothers. We examine only women who have formed
families before age 28, using the proportion of early motherhood spent receiving food stamp income to predict outcomes
up to age 40 in the areas of family income-to-needs, time spent
with low income, and amount of transfer income.
Such a study has implications for those who argue that
policies intended to alleviate poverty instead intensify economic problems for the poor by making them less self-reliant
(Hermstein & Murray, 1994; Horn, 2002; Mead, 1986, 1998;
Murray, 1984). Although this indictment is considerably less
likely to be leveled against food stamp use than against the use
of cash assistance, to the extent that the image raised by such
a prominent critique of the cadre of U.S. poverty programs is
one of sustained and prolonged dependency, we need models
of program effects that capture not only those conditions that
accompany or immediately follow an initial period of program
participation, but also those that are experienced much later
in an individual's life course. Further, isolating particular programs as major contributors to individuals' economic struggles
requires careful attention to the ways in which program effects
may be confounded by those individual and familial factors
potentially associated with participation (Blank & Ruggles,
1996).
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Background and Significance

A considerable body of research has examined associations between participation in the FSP and a range of health
and nutrition outcomes, including food spending, nutrient
availability, dietary quality, and food security, with notably
mixed results (Breunig & Dasgupta, 2005; Burstein, Price,
Rossi, & Fox, 2004; Currie, 2003; Gibson-Davis & Foster, 2006).
More recent studies have extended the set of outcomes to
include consumption stabilization (Blundell & Pistaferri, 2003;
Gundersen & Ziliak, 2003), obesity (Baum, 2007; Ver Ploeg
& Ralston, 2008), healthy food choices (Frazao, Andrews,
Smallwood, & Prell, 2007), and other indicators of family and
child well-being, such as children's math and reading test
scores (Frongillo, Jyoti, & Jones, 2006).
Most of this research focuses on conditions and outcomes
immediately associated with FSP participation. What happens
to food stamp recipients after they leave the program or over
the long run is largely unknown. Two studies have looked at
factors associated with returns to participation after exits, tracking individuals up to 30 months after they exited the program
(Blank & Ruggles, 1994; Gleason, Schochet, & Moffitt, 1998),
but there is no research that has examined other or longer-term
outcomes. Moreover, while substantial attention has been paid
to the long-term consequences of receiving other forms of government assistance (Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Cancian,
1998; Newman, Holupka, & Harkness, 2009; Vartanian &
McNamera, 2004), there is no comparable literature on the
economic consequences of early adult FSP participation, either
alone or in conjunction with other government assistance programs. Several of these studies have found that government
assistance has minimal, if any, detrimental long-term effects
on economic outcomes (Newman et al., 2009; Vartanian &
McNamara, 2004).
Although many of the existing studies on FSP-participation effects rely on comparisons between recipients and eligible non-recipients, there is widespread acknowledgement that
this approach may be hampered by unmeasured differences
between these groups, differences that, if associated with the
outcome of interest, will bias results (Fraker, Martini, & Ohls,
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1995; Gibson-Davis & Foster, 2006; Krueger, Rogers, RidaoCano, & Hummer, 2004). For example, in apparent conflict
with the FSP's goal of improving nutrition and health among
recipient families, the majority of existing studies suggest that
food stamp income either increases or has no effect on food
insecurity (Gundersen, Jolliffe, & Tiehen, 2009; Gundersen &
Oliveira, 2001; Wilde & Nord, 2005). However, there is substantial evidence that the primary driver of this finding may be
pre-existing differences between recipient and non-recipient
households. Blank and Ruggles (1996) find that women who
enroll in cash assistance programs, the FSP, or both, tend to
have lower past, current, and future anticipated earnings than
those who do not; they also tend to have more children, fewer
years of education, and a higher incidence of disability than
their eligible, non-recipient peers.
The line of reasoning suggested above asserts that it is not
food stamp receipt per se that leads to particular participant
outcomes but rather some, often unmeasured or unmeasurable, trait linked to both. Such traits are usually thought of as
unfavorable (e.g., acute need, poor health) and as leading to
unfavorable outcomes, but it is also possible that the opposite
may be true (e.g., willingness to engage in help-seeking behavior could have long-term benefits). Several recent studies have
found that correcting for selection bias using instrumental variables, propensity score matching, or switching probit models
reveals relationships that are interpretable in ways favorable
to the FSP: specifically, that receipt of food stamps reduces
food insecurity (Mykerezi & Mills, 2008; Yen, Andrews, Chen,
& Eastwood, 2008) or, at a minimum and to a limited extent,
its severity (Gibson-Davis & Foster, 2006); and may lower
mortality for participants relative to a condition of non-receipt
(Krueger et al., 2004).
A relationship between FSP participation and future outcomes that is driven by unmeasured family differences is not a
causal one, so it becomes important to account for these differences in trying to isolate a relationship between participation
and economic conditions. For this reason, we examine both
standard regression models and sister fixed-effects models to
account for unmeasured family background differences. As we
explain in greater detail below, it is also important to note that
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we are examining exposure to the FSP, measured as a proportion of time in early motherhood with FSP participation, rather
than strict categories of receipt versus eligible, non-receipt.
Setting aside for the moment pre-existing differences between groups, there are a number of reasons that the
economic outcomes of FSP participants might differ from
those of nonparticipants. Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Hoynes
and Schanzenbach (2007), and Keane and Moffitt (1998) find
that FSP participation may produce some reduction in labor
supply, although as with other FSP-participation outcomes,
their results are mixed. Because paid employment contributes
to the development or maintenance of skills and abilities that
increase the value of an individual to prospective employers, labor supply reductions suggest that food stamp receipt
may lead to lower future earnings for individual families.
Detrimental effects accrue with time spent in the program, both
because individuals grow more dependent on government aid
the longer they use it, and because labor market skills deteriorate the longer a person is out of the labor market.
Alternatively, and depending on how assistance is used,
use of food assistance could contribute to human capital gains
and greater earning ability. An individual who uses a spell
of food stamps to complete a training or education program
may have greater future earnings. Moreover, evidence suggests that FSP participation acts as a consumption stabilizer,
also potentially contributing to human capital gains (Blundell
& Pistaferri, 2003; Gundersen & Ziliak, 2003). Consumption
stability may lead to better health, and better health may contribute to higher, more consistent earnings. For example, using
PSID data during the years of food stamp program rollout, and
comparing data from low-education, female household heads
living in counties that participate in the FSP, to data for those
living in non-participating counties, Hoynes and Schanzenbach
(2007) find no consistent evidence that FSP participation affects
family income and some evidence that participation reduces
the likelihood of illness-related work absences.
We examine whether FSP participation has negative economic effects for recipient mothers relative to low income, nonrecipient mothers, both in the short-run and the longer-run.
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Data and Variables
Sample
Study data come from the 1968 to 2005 PSID, a nationally
representative, longitudinal data set that began in 1968 with
approximately 5,000 families and 18,000 individuals, and expanded to include over 8,000 families and nearly 23,000 individuals by 2005. The PSID oversampled families in poverty
and black families to obtain relatively large sample sizes for
these groups. With weights, the sample is representative of the
non-immigrant United States population.
Using the longitudinal advantages of the PSID, we select
and follow women with children for up to a 38-year span.
We examine women over initial four-year periods from two
overlapping samples: (a) "younger young mothers," those
who became PSID-designated "heads of households" or wives
with child(ren), at less than 23 years of age (becoming, at most,
age 25 by the end of the initial period), and (b) "older young
mothers," those who became heads of households or wives
with child(ren) at less than 28 years of age (becoming, at most,
age 30 by the end of the initial period).
Each woman's characteristics (e.g., family income, number
of children) are then averaged over each of these initial periods.
The use of four-year periods is intended to capture the characteristics of the woman shortly after she has a child (generally her first, although some have children before they become
heads of households or wives), while reducing the potentially biasing effects that can result from using only one year of
data.
Outcomes are reported over five-year periods: ages 26-30,
31-35, and 36-40, as well as for the entire period, age 26-40.
We use the younger sample for the age 26-30 outcome period,
and then include the older sample (which incorporates the
younger sample because they necessarily have a child by
age 28) for the 31-35 and 36-40 age periods. Models for the
outcome periods, age 31-35 and age 36-40, using only the
"younger young mothers" sample yielded similar results to
those obtained using all young mothers, so only this latter set
of models is presented. Note that the regressions include age at
the beginning of the initial period to control for the amount of
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time between starting and ending periods. The use of discrete,
five-year outcome intervals in separate models allows us to
comment, not only on whether receipt of food stamps differentiates recipient from non-recipient women in the long run, but
also whether and to what degree any such effects persist over
the next 5 to 15 years.
Outcomes, including family income-to-needs, proportion
of time with low income, and average transfer income, are
measured at the household level-the level that is arguably of
greatest interest for policy makers. Household level outcomes
implicitly include the contribution of a spouse or other partner,
if present, and such contributions are viewed by many as a
critical factor in alleviating the poverty of low-income mothers
and their children (Maynard, Boehnan, Corbett, Sandefur, &
Mosley, 1998).
Although this study focuses on food stamps, it must
also consider cash welfare assistance [Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) at or before 1996, and Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) after, referred to hereafter as AFDC] because there is considerable joint participation
among low-income single mothers. Before passage of the 1996
welfare reform legislation, women who qualified for AFDC
were automatically eligible for food stamps, and substantial overlap between the two programs continued after 1996.
However, food stamp eligibility thresholds have been typically
higher than welfare eligibility thresholds both before and after
1996. Consequently, while the overlap in program participation is substantial, it is not total, which enables us to derive
estimates of FSP participation effects apart from AFDC participation effects.
Marriage is another factor that tends to distinguish FSPonly recipient women from joint FSP/AFDC recipient women,
as married women are considerably less likely than their nonmarried counterparts to be eligible for AFDC. Although widely
debated, the premise that marriage bolsters the economic prospects of low-income and welfare-reliant women has been prominent in recent discussions of poverty policy (Lawrence, 2007).
For this reason, as well as because AFDC primarily targets
single women, we include models that interact women's initialperiod marital status with the primary independent variables
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to determine whether independent variable effects are different for married and non-married young mothers.
Primary Independent Variables
The central question for this study is whether a mother's
early use of food stamps, or both AFDC and food stamps
jointly, predicts long-term economic outcomes. Key variables
include:
(a) proportion of time receiving only food stamps
("FSP-only recipient");
(b) proportion of time receiving food stamps and AFDC
jointly ("joint FSP/AFDC recipient");
(c) proportion of time spent with income above 150
percent of the federal poverty line (FPL), without AFDC
or food stamp receipt ("non-eligible, non-recipient");
and,
(d) proportion of time with income at or below 150
percent of the FPL, without AFDC or food stamp
receipt ("low-income, non-recipient" or "eligible, nonrecipient").
Because these variables capture proportions of an initial
four-year period of motherhood, values for individual women
range from 0 to 1, and include 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75. As noted
above, this approach differentiates those who have received
food stamp income for only one of these four years from those
who have received such income over the entire period. For
the purpose of analysis, the excluded category is proportion of
time spent as a low-income, non-recipient.We report estimates as
the differences between the two most "extreme" conditions:
receipt over all four years and low-income, non-receipt, also
over all four years.
For the low-income, non-recipient group, designating the
cut-off point for sample FSP-eligibility at 150 percent of the
FPL, rather than the actual 130 percent eligibility threshold,
has two distinct advantages. First, it allows for income fluctuation over the course of the year: some individuals living in
families with annual incomes above 130 percent of FPL may
have been eligible for food stamps for some fraction of the year.
Second, earnings may be endogenous to FSP participation, and
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it would therefore be inappropriate to use a tight bound on
earnings to define the sample.
As noted in the preceding section, our analysis includes
interactions between marital status (married versus nonmarried) and proportion of time in various recipient or
non-recipient states as primary independent variables.
Marriage is defined as being married for at least 50 percent of
the initial four-year time period.

Covariates
Other variables used in analyses are averaged over the
initial four-year period, and include: mother's race; mother's
education; number of children; age of the youngest child; age
of the head of household; family income-to-needs; state unemployment rate; maximum welfare payment for a family of four
in the state; year started in the sample; region of residence; year
entering the sample; and city size. As a proxy for a disability,
we also control for whether the woman had any work limitations during the initial period (Newman et al., 2009; Vartanian
& McNamara, 2004).
In addition to variables measured during the initial period,
regression models include several variables calculated in the
ending (i.e., outcome) periods, including: the proportion of
time in particular marital states; number of children; age in the
ending period; and whether the focal woman's work is limited
by health conditions at any point during the outcome period.
Because adult economic outcomes may be related to economic conditions in the family of origin, our models also
control for childhood household income. A full list of independent and dependent variables is given in Table 1.

Dependent Variables
We examine three economic outcomes, all measured during
the ending period. These include: (a) family income-to-needs
(or family income relative to the poverty line); (b) proportion
of time with income at or below 150 percent of the FPL; and
(c) AFDC, food stamp, and other welfare income (referred to
hereafter as transfer income).

Economic Effects of Food Stamp Receipt

111

Method
Outcomes are modeled using both sister sibling fixedeffects (FE) models and standard regression models. Use of FE
models controls for unobserved, permanent family factors, including parental factors (e.g., intelligence or emotional states),
which are factored out of the estimates if and only if they are
permanent features of the family (Duncan &Raudenbush, 2001;
Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000). Our use of these models acknowledges the possibility that low-income women enrolling
in the FSP differ from similarly eligible but non-participating
women in ways that may obscure or be mistaken for program
participation effects.
Hausman tests, which detect differences in coefficient
estimates between fixed and random effect models, indicate
that the random effects models (which produce almost identical coefficients to OLS models) produce essentially the same
results as the FE models for two of the three models. Because
standard regression models provide more powerful tests and
are not limited to women with sisters, we present only standard regression results for models of these first two outcomes.
However, for models of effects on transfer income, Hausman
tests indicate statistically significant differences in coefficient
estimates; sibling FE model coefficient estimates for food
stamp-only receipt and for joint FSP/AFDC receipt differ substantially from coefficient estimates derived from standard
models. Results for transfer income are therefore presented in
two ways: first, using tobit models (Table 3), and then using
sister fixed-effects models, as these are better able to control for
unobservable family differences (Table 4).
The type of analysis used is also determined by the distribution of each dependent variable. Results for the log of family
income-to-needs are modeled using OLS regression analysis
with robust standard errors, clustered by family status for the
women during their childhood years. To account for left censoring (i.e., a disproportionate number of zero values) of the
remaining two dependent variables, the proportion of time
with low income and total transfer income, we use tobit models
with robust standard errors.
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Results
Descriptive Results
Because the study examines differences between non-

married and married mothers, we present descriptive statistics for each group, as well as for all observations, in Table 1.
Overall, there are 3,748 observations, including 1,013 single
mothers and 2,735 married mothers. Sample sizes are larger

here than in the regression samples, because all single mothers
and all married mothers, regardless of age, are included.
Each descriptive statistic reflects an average value across
the first four years after the birth of a first child. During this
initial period, the average percent of time young mothers spend
using the FSP and AFDC jointly is 14 percent for all mothers,
but nearly 42 percent for single mothers and only four percent
for married mothers. Consistent with the higher eligibility
threshold for the FSP, the proportion of time spent receiving
food stamps alone is nine percent for all mothers, 15 percent
for single mothers, and seven percent for married mothers.

Young mothers spend an average of seventeen percent of the
initial, four-year period as low-income non-recipients, and an
average of 60 percent as non-eligible non-recipients (i.e., having

incomes above 150 percent of the federal poverty line).
Turning now to conditions measured during the ending

or outcome period, the most sizable differences between the
married and the non-married group are for the existence of

work limitations and for the four dependent variables. As
we might expect, married mothers have higher household
incomes, and single mothers have higher levels of transfer

income and time spent with low income.
Regression Results
Log of family income-to-needs. Table 2 shows the regression
results for the log of family income-to-needs over the entire
outcome period (age 26 - 40), as well as five-year sub-periods
(ages 26 - 30, 31 - 35, and 36 - 40). Joint FSP/AFDC partici-

pation has negative effects on future family income-to-needs
across the outcome age periods. The future family incometo-needs ratio is around 0.30 points lower for young mothers
with joint participation during the entire initial period, relative
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Table 1. Weighted Means and Standard Deviations for Married and
Non-Married Mother Groups
All Mothers

Non-Married
Mothers

Married
Mothers

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Percent of time joint FSP/AFDC recipient

14.41

30.00

41.81

40.80

4.26

15. 37

Percent of time FSP-only recipient

9.34

20.26

15.10

24.81

7.39

17.83

25.40

15.81

26.08

Initial Period Variables

Percent of time low-income, non-recipient

16.74

26.21

22.24

Percent of time non-eligible, non-recipient

59.51

41.79

21.15

31.11

72.54

36.37

Non-married mother

0.27

0.44

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Married mother

0.73

0.44

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

Family income-to-needs

2.23

1.48

1.17

0.81

2.63

1.49

Grew up in low-income household

0.06

0.25

0.05

0.22

0.07

0.26

Number of children

1.61

0.89

1.69

0.98

1.59

0.85

White

0.53

0.50

0.19

0.39

0.66

0.47

0.42

0.30

0.46

Black

0.42

0.49

0.77

Not Black or White

0.04

0.20

0.04

0.20

0.04

0.20

Age of the youngest child

2.18

1.64

2.71

2.06

1.99

1.40

Max state welfare payment ($00) ($2006)

8.64

4.18

7.93

4.13

8.90

4.17

State unemployment rate

6.23

1.92

6.40

2.00

6.17

1.89

City size greater than 500,000

0.04

0.19

0.07

0.26

0.03

0.16

Living in the South

0.47

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.46

0.50

High school dropout

0.22

0.42

0.26

0.44

0.21

0.41

0.35

0.48

High school graduate

0.35

0.48

0.34

0.47

Some college

0.32

0.47

0.35

0.48

0.31

0.46

College graduate

0.11

0.31

0.06

0.23

0.12

0.33

22.63

2.97

22.02

2.79

22.86

3.00

0.13

0.34

0.30

0.46

0.07

0.25

Percent of time married

63.30

42.38

24.14

36.28

77.80

34.58

Percent of time never married

14.74

33.45

49.72

46.03

1.78

11.31

Percent of time widowed

1.56

10.40

1.70

10.85

1.52

10.22

Percent of time divorced or separated

20.39

33.63

24.44

37.00

18.89

32.17

Age at end of sample period

37.04

4.19

35.46

4.82

37.62

3.77

Number of children

2.24

1.05

2.20

1.21

2.25

0.98

Whether any work limits

0.10

0.27

0.22

0.35

0.06

0.21

Age at start of sample period
Whether any work limits
Ending PeriodVariables

Dependent Variables
Family income-to-needs

2.45

1.89

1.55

1.32

2.78

1.96

Percent of time with low-income

34.60

39.06

59.67

40.05

25.34

34.34

1.16

3.09

2.55

4.42

0.64

2.22

Transfer income (000) ($2006)
N

3,748

1,013

2,735
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to young mothers with low income, but no participation over
the same initial period.
Table 2. OLS Regression Results for the Log of Family Income-toNeeds Ratio

Ages 26 - 30

Middle
Outcome
Period:
Ages 31 - 35

Late
Outcome
Period:
Ages 36 - 40

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

Full
Outcome
Period:
Ages 26 - 40
B (SE)

Joint FSP/AFDC recipient

-.29 (.09)**

-.31 (.09)**

-.31 (.08)**

-.36 (.10)***

FSP-only recipient

-.36 (.12)**

-.44 (.12)***

-.04 (.11)

-.09 (.15)

Independent Variables

Early
Outcome
Period:

Non-eligible, non-recipient

-.01 (.13)

.05 (.14)

.38 (.09)***

.24 (.11)*

Joint FSP/AFDC*Married

.23 (.12)

.30 (.12)**

-.09 (.11)

.09 (.14)

FSP-only*Married

.28 (.14)*

.38 (.14)**

-.09 (.13)

.01 (.18)

Non-eligible, non-recipient
*Married

.16 (.13)

.12 (.14)

-.22 (.10)*

-.13 (.12)

2
Adjusted R

.56

.56

.64

.57

N

2,289

2,240

3,219

2,695

Number of families

1,829

1344

2,551

2,175

Note: OLS regression is used for the log of family income-to-needs with a full set of
control variables. *p < .05. **p <.01. ***p < .001.

For food stamp-only receipt, we find strong negative
effects in the early outcome period (ages 26 - 30), even somewhat stronger than the effects for joint usage, but these coefficient estimates decrease in size and significance over time,
until the coefficient estimates are close to zero in the last two
outcome periods. We find some differences between married
and non-married mothers, with the effects of food stamp-only
receipt for married mothers close to zero or zero in all outcome
periods.

Proportion of time with low income (below 150 percent of the
poverty line). As shown in Table 3, we find no evidence that
joint FSP/AFDC receipt during an initial four-year period of
motherhood has a long-term impact on the proportion of adulthood spent with low income. However, we do find that, relative to non-married mothers, married mothers spend less time
with low income over the full outcome and the early outcome
periods, with a statistically significant interaction coefficient
of -0.45 in the early period and -0.27 in the full period. These
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differences for married and non-married mothers in the full
period results appear to be driven by the initial period outcomes and not by later period outcomes.
Table 3. Tobit Regression Results for the Proportion of Time with
Low Income and Transfer Income

Independent Variables

Full
Outcome
Period:
Ages 26 - 40

Early
Outcome
Period:
Ages 26 - 30

Middle
Outcome
Period:
Ages 31 - 35

Late
Outcome
Period:
Ages 36 - 40

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

Percentageof time with low income
Joint FSP/AFDC recipient

.08 (.07)

.10 (.11)

.19 (.13)

.28 (.17)

FSP-only recipient

.19 (.09)*

.28 (.15)

.05 (.18)

-.24 (.23)

Non-eligible, non-recipient

-.22 (.10)*

-.50 (.16)**

-.61 (.16)**

Joint FSP/AFDC*Married

-.23 (.10)*

-.45 (.17)**

.04 (.19)

.11 (.25)

-.16 (.12)

-.27 (.19)**

.15 (.22)

.49 (.28)

-.08 (.10)

-.09 (.16)

.15 (.17)

.49 (.22)*

.39

.37

.37

.32

.27 (.05)***

.41 (.07)***

.28 (.08)***

.19 (.07)**

FSP-only recipient

.14 (.07)*

.31 (.09)***

.22 (.10)*

.12 (.10)

Non-eligible, non-recipient

-.13 (.08)

-.15 (.11)

-.40 (.12)*

-.10 (.10)

Joint FSP/AFDC*Married

.04 (.08)

.08 (.11)

.17 (.11)

-.03 (.11)

FSP-only*Married
Non-eligible, non-recipient
*Married
Adjusted R2

.11 (.09)

.10 (.12)

.12 (.13)

.07 (.13)

.07 (.08)

.08 (.11)

.24 (.12)*

.11 (.11)

FSP-only*Married
Non-eligible, non-recipient
*Married
2
Adjusted R

-.71 (.21)*

Transfer Income
Joint FSP/AFDC recipient

.54

.47

.44

.45

N

2,289

2,240

3,219

2,695

Number of families

1,829

1344

2,551

2,175

Note: Tobit regression is used for the percentage of time with low income and for
transfer income with a full set of control variables.
*p <.05. **p < .01. ***p <.001.

We find similar results for food stamp usage alone. The coefficient estimate for FSP-only receipt becomes statistically significant only in the model used to predict proportion of future
time with low income over the entire 15-year period. This
finding appears to be driven by early outcome period effects,
which then fade over time. The interaction of marital status
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with food stamp program participation variables suggests that
younger mothers who are married fare better than those who
are not, but only in the early outcome period, where the effect
of FSP participation is close to zero for married mothers.
Transfer income. As shown in Table 3, standard regression
models suggest that joint FSP/AFDC participation during
initial motherhood years substantially increases the amount
of transfer income used during the early outcome period (age
26-30), with weaker but still statistically significant increases
during the subsequent outcome periods. For the entire 15-year
outcome period, standard regression models indicate positive,
statistically significant effects of joint FSP/AFDC participation
on future transfer income.
However, as described fully in the Methods section, we
find that sister sibling fixed-effects regression models offer a
better fit for the relationship between young mothers' participation in the Food Stamp Program, and their future transfer
income. As shown in Table 4, for the later outcome period (age
36 - 40), we find substantially smaller and insignificant effects
using the sister fixed-effects model, relative to the standard regression (i.e., tobit) model, suggesting that the tobit estimates
may be overestimating the effects of joint participation. We also
ran a tobit model using only young mothers and their sisters,
with results similar to those achieved using the full-sample
tobit model (b = 0.26, significant at the 0.01 level). These results
suggest that sample differences (i.e., a sisters sample versus a
full sample) do not account for the differences in coefficient
estimates between the tobit and FE models, but rather that the
FE model better estimates the effects of joint participation.
For young mothers who participate in the Food Stamp
Program alone, the future transfer income story is much the
same. Standard regression models suggest that FSP-only recipients have higher levels of future transfer income relative
to their low-income, non-recipient peers (Table 3). Projected
transfer income is higher for FSP-only recipients than for lowincome non-recipients during the age 26 - 30 outcome period
and, though to a lesser degree, for the age 31 - 35 outcome
period. The effect disappears, however, for the age 36 - 40
outcome period.
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Regressions for Transfer Income

Independent Variables

Full
Outcome
Period:
Ages 26 - 40

Early
Outcome
Period:
Ages 26 - 30

Middle
Outcome
Period:
Ages 31 - 35

Late
Outcome
Period:
Ages 36 - 40

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

B (SE)

.17 (.06)"

.29 (.08)***

.16 (.06)"

.04 (.05)

Transfer Income
Joint FSP/AFDC recipient
FSP-only recipient

.05 (.09)

.13 (.12)

.00 (.08)

-.06 (.06)

Non-eligible, non-recipient

-.09 (.09)

-.09 (.11)

-.20 (.08)"

-.08 (.06)

Joint FSP/AFDC*Married

-.01 (.09)

.05 (.12)

-.04 (.09)

-.01 (.07)

FSP-only*Married
Non-eligible, non-recipient
Married
2
W/in R

-.07 (.12)

-.15 (.16)

-.04 (.12)

.06 (.09)

.03 (.09)

.02 (.11)

.11 (.08)

.08 (.06)

.34

.37

.31

.18

742

1,119

876

/

451 / 2.5

775

N
Number of families /
Average size

321

/

2.4

311

2.4

356

/

2.5

Note: Results are for sister fixed effects models with a full set of control variables.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

In the FE models shown on Table 4, we find that the effects
of FSP-only receipt on future transfer income are small and
statistically insignificant, in this case for all age categories. As
with the models for joint FSP/AFDC receipt, these differences
again appear to be attributable to the statistical controls introduced by the FE models.
In the FE models shown in Table 4, we do not find differences in the relationship between FSP participation, either
alone or jointly with AFDC, and future transfer income for
married and non-married women.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have tested the question of whether the use of food
stamps, either alone or in conjunction with other types of government assistance, results in economic or other hardships in
later life, or whether simply being poor, or the combination
of poverty and other factors, threatens economic outcomes for
married and non-married mothers. The results indicate that if
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we were to look solely at the entire 15-year outcome period, we
might conclude that the effects of government assistance are
adverse and far-reaching-that food stamps taken when one
is a young mother negatively impact economic outcomes over
the long run. Our data indicate that this conclusion may well
be faulty and premature. By looking at five-year periods after
the initial young parenting period, we find that it is generally
only the period between the ages of 26 - 30 that is affected by
time using food stamps. If other, longer periods after the initial
period show any effects at all, these effects generally diminish
as time passes.
Our models show that joint participation, however, does
affect outcomes, such as lower future family income-to-needs,
and for earlier outcome periods, receiving more transfer
income, relative to those who have low income without public
assistance in the initial period. We acknowledge that the reference group in these models (time with incomes below 150% of
the poverty line) will tend to have higher income relative to
those on AFDC, and therefore may not be an appropriate reference group. Our reference group was better suited for comparison with those who spend time using food stamps. However,
we find no differences between those who jointly use AFDC
and food stamps in future time spent with low income, relative to low-income, non-recipients, either in the short run or
long run.
Generally, we found few differences between married and
single mothers. While some short-term differences were found,
these differences did not last over the long-term. These results
support the notion that food stamp usage alone negatively
affects some outcomes but that these effects are generally shortlived. For all outcomes, including income-to-needs, time with
low income, and transfer income, we find that young mothers
who use food stamp income alone have similar economic outcomes to low-income, non-recipient mothers. These results for
food stamp recipients run counter to theories of dependency
for public assistance recipients.
In general, we do not find that time receiving food stamps
improves the economic situation of young mothers relative to
those with low income and no transfer assistance. At the same
time, because of the generally short-lived nature of initial food
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stamp usage effects, we find that the long-term impact of time
on food stamps is neither positive nor negative for the economic
outcomes we have examined relative to time with low income
without government assistance. Thus, if, as some studies have
suggested, the use of food stamps leads to positive outcomes
in other or non-economic areas, such as nutrition, consumption stabilization, or physical and emotional well-being, these
alone may well justify continued support of the food stamp
program (Perez-Escamilla et al., 2000).
It is important to emphasize that while there are few differences over the long run between the transfer and non-transfer
income groups, this does not mean that either group, especially single mothers, fares particularly well over the long run.
Income is barely over the poverty line for the early outcome
period (age 26 - 30), and is at or near 150 percent of the poverty
line at ages 31 - 35 and 36 - 40 (results not shown). In light

of these descriptive findings, we would also caution against
construing certain economic outcomes as negative in a prescriptive, rather than a statistical sense. What may be "good"
economically may not be so for the less quantifiable outcomes
of health and well-being, such as caring for children. As a goal
shared by food and nutrition programs more generally, "ensuring the health of vulnerable Americans" may be seen as
having implications beyond the nutritional (Fox, Hamilton, &
Christenson, 2004, p. 1).
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